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We consider the Deduction Theorem that is used in the literature of game theory
to run a purported proof by contradiction. In the context of game theory, it is stated
that if we have a proof of φ ` ϕ, then we also have a proof of φ ⇒ ϕ. Hence, the
proof of φ⇒ ϕ is deduced from a previous known statement. However, we argue that
one has to manage to prove that the clauses φ and ϕ exist, i.e., they are known true
statements in order to establish that φ ` ϕ is provable, and that therefore φ ⇒ ϕ is
provable as well. Thus, we are only allowed to reason with known true statements,
i.e., we are not allowed to assume that φ or ϕ exist. Doing so, leads immediately to a
wrong conclusion. Apart from this, we stress to other facts why the Deduction Theo-
rem is not applicable to run a proof by contradiction. Finally, we present an example
from industrial cooperation where the Deduction Theorem is not correctly applied with
the consequence that the obtained result contradicts the well-known aggregation issue.
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1 Introduction
We review a common practice in the literature of game theory of applying the Deduction Theorem
(Herbrand Theorem, 1930) on a purported proof by contradiction. This theorem is a meta-theorem
of mathematical logic, which states that if a known proposition/clause ϕ within a calculus system
is deducible (provable) by some known clauses φ1, . . . , φn from the calculus system – written more
formally as φ1, . . . , φn ` ϕ, then the derived term within the calculus system is also provable.
Notice that the calculus system describes a logical consistent and complete rule (a calculus) of
how we can get new logical terms (clauses) from already known true statements. It is the closed
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Deduction Theorem: The Problematic Nature of Common Practice
logical framework/system from which we obtain new results. Or to state it differently, a calculus
system describes the axiomatic theory of propositional logic. For a more thorough discussion, we
refer the reader to Ebbinghaus et al. (2007).
In the literature of game theory, authors apply a reduced form of the Deduction Theorem, in
particular, while trying to run an indirect proof. In this context, it is stated that if we have a
proof of φ ` ϕ, then we also have a proof of φ⇒ ϕ. Thus, if we have managed to prove the clauses
φ and ϕ, they are known true statements of a calculus system from which the provability of φ ` ϕ
can be obtained. This means that if we have successfully reasoned on the provability of φ ` ϕ,
then the derived judgment that φ⇒ ϕ is provable can be deduced. Unfortunately, this is not the
common practice observed in game theory.1 In contrast, authors impose existence assumptions on
φ and ϕ to reason that φ ` ϕ is provable, and that this proves φ⇒ ϕ. By the foregoing reasoning
it should be clear that we are only allowed to reason with known true statements, that is, we are
not allowed to assume that φ or ϕ exist. Doing so, leads immediately to a wrong conclusion.
The remainder of the treatise is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short refresher of
some essential aspects of propositional logic. Having discussed this, we are going to discuss in more
detail within Section 3 the incorrect application of the Deduction Theorem while trying to run a
proof by contradiction. Whereas Section 4 is dedicated to an example from the literature, where
an author derives results while applying the Deduction Theorem incorrectly, that is, imposing an
existence assumption that contradicts the well-known issue of bequeathing essential properties of
a function from an individual to an aggregate level. We close our considerations with some final
remarks in Section 5.
2 Propositional Logic: A Refresher
For presenting a reminder of propositional logic, we introduce two truth tables. A logical state-
ment/proposition is formed by the symbols A or B, which means that a statement A is true or
false. However, the inversion is formed by the negation of a proposition by using the logical term
“not” denoted by ¬. If A is a proposition, then ¬A is the negation of A verbalized as “not A” or
“A is false”. The effect of negation, conjunction, disjunction, and implication on the truth values
of logical statements is summarized by a so-called truth table. In this table, the capital letter T
indicates a true proposition and F indicates that it is false.
A B ¬B A⇒ B ¬(A⇒ B) A⇐ B A⇔ B A ∨ ¬B A ∧B A ∨B
F F T T F T T T F F
F T F T F F F F F T
T F T F T T F T F T
T T F T F T T T T T
A B ¬A ¬B ¬A⇒ ¬B A ∨ ¬B ¬A⇐ ¬B ¬A ∨B A ∧ ¬B ¬A⇔ ¬B
F F T T T T T T F T
F T T F F F T T F F
T F F T T T F F T F
T T F F T T T T F T
Two statements are indicated as logically equivalent through the symbol ≡. For instance, by the
1Personally, we have the impression that the great majority of game theorist is not really aware that they base
their argumentation on the Deduction Theorem.
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truth table we realize that the two statements ¬A ⇐ ¬B and ¬A ∨ B are logically equivalent,
which is formally expressed by (¬A ⇐ ¬B) ≡ (¬A ∨ B). A falsum ⊥ is, for instance, the
conjunction A ∧ ¬A whereas a tautology > can be expressed, for instance, by the disjunction
¬A ∨ A. Moreover, a proposition or premise A might satisfy a falsum or a tautology or an
arbitrary property B, which is expressed by (A ` ⊥) or (A ` >) or (A ` B) respectively. This
should not be confounded with an implication of the form (A ⇒ ⊥) or (A ⇒ >) or (A ⇒ B)
respectively.
Finally, to capture a material implication or adjunctive logical statements by a concise no-
tation, we also refer to φ or to ϕ. A material implication is a rule of replacement that allows
to replace a conditional proposition by a disjunction. For instance, the conditional statement A
implies B can be replaced by the disjunction ¬A ∨B, which is logically equivalent to the former
proposition (see the truth table).
These information are enough to discuss some formal representations of an indirect proof,
which is also called a proof by contradiction. This proof technique enables us to prove a proposition
A by establishing that the negation ¬A implies something that we know to be false. Hence, the
negation ¬A contradicts a known true statement.
To show that a proposition A and its negation ¬A cannot both be true, some uses the rep-
resentation of a conditional statement like ¬A ⇒ A to conclude that ¬A and A cannot both be
true, and that a contradiction occurs with the consequence that the initial assumption must be
wrong and A must be true. But this is fallacy, which confounds ¬A⇒ A with ¬A ` A. First of
all, ¬A ⇒ A simply says that if ¬A is false then A must be true, and if ¬A is true, then A has
to be false. On this statement is nothing contradictory. Moreover, we do not have ¬A ∧A as we
can observe by the following chain of equivalences
(¬A⇒ A) ≡ (¬(¬A) ∨A) ≡ (A ∨A) ≡ A.
Hence, ¬A⇒ A is equivalent to A, but not to ¬A∧A. In contrast, a representation of an indirect
proof by ¬A ` A indicates that the initial assumption made by ¬A is false, since ¬A satisfies A.
Here one deduces that ¬A cannot hold, the initial assumption is wrong and A holds. But this
is not an implication, this is a deduction. This reveals that deduction and implication are not
synonymous expressions.
Alternatively, to involve that a proposition φ “satisfies” a falsum ⊥ in order to conclude that
in fact ¬φ holds and a contradiction is derived, we write (φ ` ⊥)⇔ ¬φ. This constitutes a formal
expression of an indirect proof. Notice that this has per se nothing to do with an application of
the forthcoming Deduction Theorem, hence it is allowed to assume that φ exists. Be aware that
imposing the assumption φ is not anymore allowed if we apply the Deduction Theorem to reason
that (φ ` ⊥) is provable to finally conclude that (φ⇒ ⊥) is provable as well. Moreover, it should
be evident that this is not the same as (φ ⇒ ⊥) ⇔ ¬φ. Since in the former case we have that a
proposition φ “satisfies” ⊥ whereas in the latter case a proposition φ “implies” ⊥.
3 The Deduction Theorem
The Deduction Theorem (Herbrand Theorem, 1930) is roughly stating that each judgment of a
calculus system must be logically independent and consistent in order to conclude that the derived
judgment is deducible (cf. Ebbinghaus et al. (2007, Chap. 11.)). This means, for instance, that if
we have a proof of φ ` ϕ, then we also have a proof of φ ⇒ ϕ. Notice that the clause φ ` ϕ is
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provable, whenever φ and ϕ are consistent and logically independent clauses of a calculus system.
Here, the term consistent can be interpreted as indicating provable as well, or to put it differently,
they are known true statements, saying that the clauses φ and ϕ must exist. Hence, φ and ϕ can
only be used, if we have managed to prove it. Thus, to prove φ ` ϕ, we are only allowed to reason
with known true statements, that is, we are not allowed to assume φ, for instance; otherwise this
leads immediately to a wrong conclusion (see the forthcoming discussion of Section 4).
Obviously, it is only possible to get a derived deduction from a system of logical clauses that
already exist. Saying that from a consistent and closed calculus system containing φ and ϕ, a
deduction φ ` ϕ can be obtained, from which we can infer that the clause φ ⇒ ϕ is provable.
However, it is common practice in the literature of game theory that authors try to deduce φ ` ϕ
while assuming that φ is true with one possible false statement ϕ, in order to conclude that
φ⇒ ϕ is provable. It should be evident that this contradicts the foregoing described procedure to
correctly apply the Deduction Theorem, and therefore violates good practice of logical reasoning.
3.1 Incorrect Application of the Deduction Theorem
By the foregoing discussion we have argued that the Deduction Theorem was not correctly applied
in the literature of game theory. In particular, as we shall see in a short while, this practice finds
wide application to run a purported proof by contradiction. In the course, we shall now take the
opportunity to refute by a more thorough reasoning the arguments which are presented in favor
of its application in the game theory literature.
There is a growing literature of game theory (cf. Meinhardt (2015, 2016a,b, 2017a, 2018a,b)),
where one can find incorrect applications of the indirect proof w.r.t. a logical sentence like
A⇒ B, (3.1)
that cannot be managed to prove it directly. It is argued that the sentence (3.1) is, neverthe-
less, provable by assuming that this is a wrong judgment while establishing that the equivalent
implication given by
(A ∧ ¬B)⇒ (A ∧ ¬A), (3.2)
is a valid logical sentence. Hence, these authors claimed that such a logical sentence is deducible,
and that it is therefore a correct logical judgment. A fortiori, we shall establish that this is not a
provable statement. That means, there exists no valid proof for the implication (3.2).
Note, in order to apply the Deduction Theorem we have to take into account that if a proposi-
tion is provable (deducible), then it is a correct (true) logical statement, and if it is a true logical
statement, then it is provable. In the course of this discussion, we shall now investigate the issue
for (3.2) in more detail.
In the following, we first demonstrate that this implication is not a true logical statement in
order to apply the Deduction Theorem. To see this, we redefine the implication by setting
(A ∧ ¬B) := ¬(A⇒ B) (A ∧ ¬A) := ¬(A⇒ A). (3.3)
Then, the implication of (3.2) can be rewritten as
¬(A⇒ B)⇒ ¬(A⇒ A). (3.4)
3
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By the assumption made in the literature that A ⇒ B is a false judgment, which is the case
whenever A is true i.e., T , and B is false (F ), we get
¬(A⇒ B)⇒ ¬(A⇒ A)
¬(T ⇒ F )⇒ ¬(A⇒ A)
¬(F )⇒ ¬(T ⇒ T )
T ⇒ ¬(T )
T ⇒ F
F.
(3.5)
Thus, we observe by these arguments that the implication (3.4) is not a valid logical statement.
From the point of view that this is not a true logical statement, it is also not provable.
At the final step let us check if the expression ¬(A⇒ B) satisfies ¬(A⇒ A) i.e., ¬(A⇒ B) `
¬(A ⇒ A) is a deduction, for which authors give no rigorous logical argument, instead of that
they refer to fatal logical arguments to make their point that (3.2) is provable while applying for
(φ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ incorrect arguments.
To answer this issue, we note first that it is well known that A⇒ B is a deducible expression,
but then the negation of A ⇒ B, the expression ¬(A ⇒ B) cannot be deducible. Similar, we
know that A⇒ A is a deduction, but then the negation of A⇒ A i.e., ¬(A⇒ A), is not deducible
as well. From these findings, it is obvious that there exists no deduction ¬(A⇒ B) ` ¬(A⇒ A)
at all, and therefore no proof. Otherwise, one would say that a non deducible expression can be
deduced by something which is not deducible. This is obviously absurd. Moreover, what does it
mean if we could deduce something from an inconsistency? Now, this would simply mean that
from something inconsistent one can deduce everything, therefore we would have ¬(A⇒ B) ` C,
for every C, including C := ¬(A ⇒ A). Of course, this also is an absurd judgment. Moreover,
it is mandatory to establish that the calculus system is logically independent, which means in
that case, one has to show that the prerequisites A and B are logically independent. From these
findings, we may conclude that there exists no valid deduction ¬(A ⇒ B) ` ¬(A ⇒ A), and the
expression is therefore not provable. Since this is not a deduction, it is also not a true logical
statement.
Summarizing our results: First, we have established that the Deduction Theorem is not ap-
plicable. Second, we may even conclude that there exists no proof for (A ∧ ¬B) ⇒ (A ∧ ¬A).
Hence, there is no deduction ¬(A ⇒ B) ` ¬(A ⇒ A) to conclude that ¬(A ⇒ B) ⇒ ¬(A ⇒ A)
is a correct logical statement.
4 Aggregation across Firms: A Fallacy
In the course of this Section, we shall develop by means of an example that wrong conclusions
will be made whenever the Deduction Theorem is not correctly applied. Conclusions that are
inconsistent to known true statements from the literature as in the forthcoming example.
For this purpose, we have selected the work of Lardon (2012), who claimed by Proposition
3.1 that each characteristic function derived from a partition function approach is well defined.
We shall establish that this result contradicts aggregate behavior that is well known from the
theory of consumers (see Russell (1983); Varian (1992); Jerison (1993); Russell and Farris (1993);
Russell (1996); Russell and Farris (1998)), which is, however, also a relevant issue for the theory
4
Deduction Theorem: The Problematic Nature of Common Practice
of industrial cooperation, since one has to aggregate across firms. Even in the latter case the
aggregate profit function must satisfy the crucial properties of quasi-concavity and continuity.
As we shall learn in a while, the second property cannot be guaranteed on an aggregated level
while introducing regular conditions (cf. Nash (1951); van Damme (1991); Maschler et al. (2013))
like compactness and convexity of the strategy set; and continuity as well as quasi-concavity of
player’s profit function. To be more precise, continuity of the individual profit function of a
normal form game is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of continuity of a profit function
of a derived aggregate normal form game. By the mentioned literature from consumer theory,
we know that consumers utility functions must be of Gorman form to get an aggregate demand
function that inherits their properties. This type of utility function is quasi-linear, or to put
it differently, it is linear in the numeraire good. A property that cannot be guaranteed for an
aggregate profit function of an industry, and that cannot assure either that aggregate best reply
functions are continuous. However, by pointing to this reference from consumer theory, we notice
that a particular form of individual profit functions is needed to bequeath their properties to the
aggregate profit function of an cartel, for instance.
In order to work out the conflict to Lardon (2012, Proposition 3.1), we focus on the γ-
characteristic function – that is, outsiders’ behavior is characterized by the γ-belief to specify
the partition function from which finally the characteristic function is derived (see Hart and Kurz
(1983), and for an application in industrial cooperation Meinhardt (2017b)) – to establish that
this function may not be well-defined, and that therefore a Nash equilibrium (partial agreement
equilibrium) for a particular coalition structure based on oligopoly situation without transferable
technologies cannot be expected to exist while aggregating across firms. The conflict is caused by
an incorrect application of the proof by contradiction that fades out the aggregation issue with
the fatal consequence that the author concludes that γ-characteristic function is well-defined, and
that the Nash-equilibrium always exists for normal form games w.r.t. a partition of the player
set that is based on the γ-belief. Which is a fallacy, since the intrinsic aggregation issue clearly
excluded this possibility. Thus, there may exist no Nash equilibrium for that specific coalition
structure, which contradicts the assertion of Proposition 3.1. An effect which is for Cournot
oligopoly games only visible due to combinatorial reasons from five firms onward. This issue shall
be investigated in greater detail by the forthcoming counter-example.
4.1 Investigation of the Arguments
During this discussion, we quote his fatal logical arguments while running a purported indirect
proof that leads the author to wrong conclusion. Notice, we only summarize the main arguments
of the author without going into the details, and without discussing the notation as well as the
definitions. To start with, we recall Lardon (2012, Proposition 3.1) and quoting his proposition
as a simple statement to mark the incorrectness.
Statement 4.1. Let 〈N, (Xk, pik)k∈N 〉 be a normal form game. Then for any coalition structure
P ∈ Π(N), there exists an equilibrium under P.
Some arguments, we are going to present here, have been already developed within the work
of Meinhardt (2015, 2016a,b, 2017a). Nevertheless, we present some refinements and extensions
of our argumentation that go beyond those we have in particular been applied in Meinhardt
(2015, Section 4). For a quick reminder of propositional logic, the inclined reader ought consult
Section 2.
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In the article of Lardon (2012), the author claims to provide for the class of oligopoly TU
games an existence result of the γ-core and a single-valued allocation rule inside of the γ-core
that is called by the author Nash Pro rata-value. Moreover, he asserts to present an axiomatic
characterization of the NP-value. Nevertheless, this article is strongly flawed due to the fact that
the author confuses and mixes up non-equivalent fundamental statements from propositional logic
while applying false indirect arguments.
In particular, the author deduces wrong conclusions from logical statements derived from an
indirect proof which relies on a material implication. In this context, he neither recognizes the
logical relationship (A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A) ≡ (A ⇒ B) nor (¬A ∧ B ⇒ ¬A ∧ A) ≡ (B ⇒ A).
Moreover, he does not notice that the left hand side of these equivalence relations is in each case
an inappropriate application of the Deduction Theorem (cf. Subsection 3). This theorem involves
that each judgment in a calculus system must be consistent and logically independent to conclude
that the derived judgment is deducible (cf. Ebbinghaus et al. (2007, Chap. 11.)). In contrast
to these premises we observe that the negation of A ⇒ B, the expression ¬(A ⇒ B) cannot be
deducible. Analogously, we know that A⇒ A is a deduction, but then the negation of A⇒ A i.e.,
¬(A⇒ A), is not deducible as well. Thus, the author claims that one gets something consistent
that is based on inconsistencies, which is absurd. Finally, the author has failed to establish that
the calculus system is logically independent, which means in that case, he failed to show that the
prerequisites A and B are logically independent. None of the applied arguments of the author
allow us to conclude that (A∧¬B)⇒ (A∧¬A) is provable, and therefore a valid logical sentence.
We now outline why his purported proof of the “sufficiency case” of Proposition 3.1 must be
wrong. Similar as in other examples from the literature (cf. Meinhardt (2015, 2016a,b, 2017a,
2018a,b)), he uses elements from a material implication for establishing the logical equivalent
proposition if A then B. This author starts with A ∧ ¬B to perform this kind of proof to get a
contradiction in order to conclude that the implication A ⇒ B is drawn. Therefore, the author
does not recognize that whenever a valid premise A ∧ ¬B implies something false like ¬A, one
cannot get a valid logical sentence. As we stressed out in the previous paragraph, he deduces from
a non-deducible sentence something that is non-deducible, which cannot be consistent. In this
case, the implication must be a falsehood, which says that the clause is not provable. From which
immediately follows – and which is the sole conclusion that can be drawn from this non provable
clause – that a Nash equilibrium of the normal form oligopoly game ΓP := (P, (XS , piS)S∈P) does
not always exist.
When we are going into the details we recognize that the author applies the prerequisite A
of the positive statement and ¬B in order to prove the contrapositive statement if ¬B ⇒ ¬A.
For doing so, he assumes that the payoff vector xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium of the normal
form oligopoly game ΓP = (P, (XS , piS)S∈P), that is, premise A holds. It should be clear that
assuming the existence of Nash equilibrium for game ΓP is not a very elegant proof technique
to ignore the aggregation issue across firms, which, nevertheless, requires more sophisticated
methods as those used by the author to overcome its problematic nature. In the next step, it is
then assumed that the strategy profile xˆ = (xˆS)S∈P ∈ XN is not a Nash equilibrium of the normal
form oligopoly game Γ = (N, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) under P, i.e., premise B is false. Premise A is then used
in his proof to construct in a first step the vector xˆ, and finally to construct the contradiction
that xˆP ∈ XP is not a Nash equilibrium (¬A). In effect, he has shown that A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A
is not consistent. As a consequence, the clause A ⇒ B must be false too, in accordance with
(A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A) ≡ (A ⇒ B). Hence, (A ∧ ¬B ⇒ A ∧ ¬A) is not consistent, and therefore
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not provable. This is the only possible conclusion w.r.t. the imposed regular conditions from
industrial organization, that do not induce a well-behaved aggregate profit function on the cartel
level. Ignoring the well-known issue of inheriting individual properties to an aggregated level, the
author incorrectly applied (φ⇒ ⊥)⇔ ¬φ while referring to fatal arguments.
For completeness, we just want to mention that the same misguided line of argument is also
given for the “necessity case”. There, he is not aware about the following logical equivalence
(¬A ∧ B ⇒ ¬A ∧ A) ≡ (B ⇒ A). No wonder that he shows that the truth ¬A ∧ B implies a
falsehood ¬A ∧A, which is as well a wrong logical clause. It follows that B ⇒ A is not provable.
In summary, he has shown in both cases the exact opposite of what he had claimed to prove
while not following a good practice of logical reasoning and fading out crucial aspects from the
aggregation issue across firms. As a consequence, Lardon has disproved his own Proposition 3.1.
In the sequel, we show what will happen if we apply a proof by contraposition ¬B ⇒ ¬A for
the “sufficiency case” in order to see where we run into problems. But then the starting point of
the proof has to be the assumption that the payoff vector xˆ ∈ XN is not a Nash equilibrium of the
normal form oligopoly game Γ = (N, (Xi, pii)i∈N ) under P (¬B), which implies by imposing the
correct assumption like quasi-concavity on the profit function pii in order to guarantee existence
of an equilibrium that ∑
i∈S
pii(xˆS , xˆ−S) ≤
∑
i∈S
pii(xˇS , xˆ−S),
is true. In this case, Formula (11) of Lardon (2012, p. 394) – that gives the definition of the
aggregate cost function CS : XS → R+ – does not ensure continuity of CS implying for the payoff
vector xˆ ∈ XN that ∑
i∈S
Ci(xˆi) = CS(xˆS).
cannot be anymore estimated. This is due that it cannot be supposed – without committing
severe logical failures due to the violation of imposing necessary and sufficient properties on firms
profit functions in order to get a representation of an aggregate profit function that inherits their
properties – that xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium. We have to stress the fact that the application of
the Deduction Theorem (cf. Section 3) requires in that case the existence (provability) of a Nash
equilibrium of the normal form game (P, (XS , piS)S∈P), which means that imposing its existence
just by an assumption is not a permissible conduct. We have seen by the foregoing consideration
that such a Nash equilibrium cannot be assured by the regular conditions imposed by the game
model. Hence, imposing its existence must lead to a wrong conclusion. Existence of an equilibrium
cannot be assured, as a consequence, it is also not anymore clear that
piS(xˆP) < piS(xˇS , xˆ−S),
is satisfied as it was claimed by Lardon (2012, p. 395). This inequality can only be obtained
when the author can establish by some logical inference in consideration of the aggregation issue
that xˆP ∈ XP is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form oligopoly game ΓP = (P, (XS , piS)S∈P)
(A is valid), but not by an assumption. Moreover, Corollary 3.2 is not correct either, implying
in connection with the disproof of Proposition 3.1 that the TU game in γ-characteristic function
form is not well-defined. Again, the results of the article are devalued according to these logical
flaws.
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4.2 Not well-behaved Aggregate Behavior across Firms
To see that a TU-game in γ-characteristic function form without transferable technologies might
not be well-defined, we introduce a Cournot oligopoly situation, denoted 〈N, (ωk)k∈N , (ck)k∈N , p〉,
with five firms N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} producing a homogeneous good and having production capac-
ities given by the vector of capacities {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5} = {2.4, 0.15, 2, 15, 20}. The individual
marginal costs of the firms are given by the cost vector {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} = {1/8, 5/2, 5, 1/24, 1}.
Thus, the cost functions are increasing in its arguments. Furthermore, we assume that the pa-
rameters of the concave inverse demand function p(X) = a− b ·X2 are given by {a, b} = {120, 1}
with joint production of X = ∑i∈N xi. Then the profit function is specified for each firm i by
pii(x) := p(X) · xi − ci · xi. Notice, that the inverse demand function p(X) is strictly decreasing
and concave in its arguments within the relevant domain.
To observe that no Nash-equilibrium can be guaranteed for the game (Pγ , (XS , piS)S∈Pγ ), we
consider the coalition structure Pγ = {{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5}}. The implicit best response function of
coalition/trust {1, 2, 3} is given by
B{1,2,3}(X¯) =

1
16
(
5773
6 − 10X¯2 − 10
√
X¯2 + 57356 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ [0, 2.4]
1
16
(
5545
6 − 10X¯2 − 10
√
X¯2 + 57356 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ (2.4, 2.55]
1
16
(
5305
6 − 10X¯2 − 10
√
X¯2 + 57356 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ (2.55, 4.55],
with X¯ = ∑i∈{1,2,3} xi. Similar, the individual best replies of outsider firms 4 and 5 are quantified
through
B4(X¯) =
3
5735
(1927
8
√
X¯2 + 955.833− 89849125 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ [0, 5]
B5(X¯) =
3
5735
(28208
119
√
X¯2 + 955.833− 85080119 X¯
)
if X¯ ∈ [0, 5].
We have depicted the individual implicit best reply functions in Figure 1, whereas Figure 2
shows the aggregate best response of cartel {1, 2, 3}, and the individual ones of outsider firms 4
and 5.
2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8
0
5
10
15
x1+x2+x3
x4
,x
5
Firm 3
Firm 2
Firm 1
Firm 5
Firm 4
Figure 1: Individual Best Reply Functions
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That we cannot guarantee a Nash-equilibrium in the game model is due that the system of
equations derived by the first-order condition is not independent, and therefore underdetermined,
i.e., the system has fewer independent equations than variables. Such a system has no solution.
This can be observed by the above system of best reply functions as well by Figure 1. The
individual best replies of firms of trust {1, 2, 3} are shifted by constants downward, they are not
independent. To guarantee in this case an equilibrium it is enough to assume that the most
efficient firm 1 of trust {1, 2, 3} has a sufficient large capacity. Thus, we can assure an intersection
of the best reply function of coalition {1, 2, 3} with that of outsider firms 4 and 5 (cf. Figure 1). But
then there is no need to focus on oligopoly TU-games without transferable technologies. Hence,
to assure an equilibrium, we have either to consider a game model with transferable technologies,
i.e., all firms of a trust can rely on the most efficient production technology, or we have to
introduce a substitution rate among the goods violating the homogeneous good assumption. While
incorporating a substitution rate under such a game model without synergy effects among the
firms, we can guarantee a Nash-equilibrium, but this would change the theoretical framework in
which firms are involved, and the γ-core might be empty. Moreover, trying to overcome the issue
of a non-existing equilibrium while incorporating capacity constraints, and making the strategy
set compact is not enough to assure an equilibrium as we can observe by Figure 2
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Figure 2: Best Reply Functions of Trust {1, 2, 3} and Outsiders
Thus, if we choose the above capacity levels, then the best reply of trust {1, 2, 3} becomes
discontinuous on the relevant domain with the consequence that we do not observe anymore
an intersection of best reply functions (cf. Figure 2). There is no intersection of best replies,
therefore no Nash-equilibrium can exist. Hence, no γ-characteristic value of coalition {1, 2, 3} can
be determined, the associated γ-characteristic function is void. This establishes that the game
model is not correctly specified, because of the mentioned aggregation issue across firms. By this
counter-example we have demonstrated that the purported proof of Lardon (2012, Proposition
3.1) is logical flawed and is therefore false.
9
5 Concluding Remarks
We presented a critical review of the common practice in game theory to run a purported proof
by contradiction while relying on the Deduction Theorem. We have argued that the arguments
which have been used in its favor are violating good practice of logical reasoning, and are therefore
wrong. To underpin our consideration, we discussed an example from the literature that obviously
conflicts with the well-known aggregation issue. We express our hope that the presented arguments
are a small contribution toward a higher reliability and consistency of the published results.
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